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Abstract 
Scholars believe that minimally counterintuitive concepts are more memorable than 
intuitive ones (Barrett, 2008; Upal 2011).  If an item has an unusual or counterintuitive property, 
such as a ball that rises rather than falls when dropped, the unusual property makes the item more 
memorable.  However, experiments investigating this effect tend to have experimental confounds 
that make interpretation difficult.  Our experiment aimed to solve these problems by using 
counterbalanced lists of nonwords, using the nonwords to control for prior associations and 
experiences. 
Participants viewed a series of nonwords along with a noun-adjective pair (e.g. Frav – a 
roaring tiger) and were told that each nonword represented a name.  Some nonwords were the 
names of an intuitive item (e.g. a roaring tiger) whereas others were counterintuitive (e.g. a 
writing tiger).  Participants rated the likelihood that the described nonword was from Earth or 
from a parallel universe where things were different.  Everyone was told to remember the 
nonwords and noun-adjective pairs for a later test.  To improve overall recall, each item was 
presented and rated twice.  After a distractor, participants were asked to recall as many of the 
nonwords as possible. 
The results revealed that counterintuitive items were not better-recalled than intuitive 
items.  In fact, in most tests, intuitive items were recalled significantly more often than intuitive 
items.  Our results do not support the Minimal Counterintuitiveness Effect and suggest that when 
to-be-remembered words and their accompanying nouns are matched across conditions 
(counterintuitive and intuitive), that intuitive information is more memorable than 
counterintuitive information. 
Introduction 
According to the basic principles of evolutionary psychology, our mind has been shaped 
by natural selection to produce behaviors and mental systems that solve fitness-relevant 
problems (Cosmeides & Tooby, 1999).  It is adaptive for humans to both learn and retain 
information effectively.  This study deals with how we learn a specific type of information: 
counterintuitive information, defined here as “information contradicting some information 
provided by ontological categories (e.g.: “animal” is an ontological category) (Boyer, 2001).” 
Counterintuitive information influences a variety of aspects of human behavior and 
cognition, from learning during infancy to the very foundations of religion and superstition 
(Barrett, 2008).  Infants to pay more attention to actions that violate their expectations, such as 
an object moving through another object (Baillargeon, 1986). Phillips & Wellman (2005) found 
that infants look significantly longer at images of adults reaching for objects in indirect ways 
(e.g., reaching for an object while sticking the reaching arm’s elbow up in the air) rather than the 
expected route of simply reaching directly for the object.  Wellman & Gellman (1998) even 
considered encounters with counterintuitive information to be important for cognitive 
development, as they help to accelerate infants’ learning of fitness-relevant information, such as 
the way animate creatures move and behave. 
Furthermore, through religion and superstition, the counterintuitive has a strong presence 
in human social groups.  Superstition is present in all societies, and it has a powerful hold on 
humanity. Almost every religion and superstition is based off at least one piece of 
Investigating the Minimal Counterintuitiveness Effect 2 
 
counterintuitive information (Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 2001; Barrett, 2008), be it living after death 
or encounters with heavenly beings.  Atran & Norenzayan (2004) noted that the core beliefs of 
almost all religions only have a few counterintuitive traits, and that objects that are slightly or 
“minimally counterintuitive” are better-remembered than objects with a large number of 
counterintuitive traits.  Some evolutionary psychologists claim that the tendency to be 
superstitious and religious is an adaptive behavior that improves the chances of a person passing 
on his or her genes by promoting large-scale and intergroup cooperation as well as higher 
fertility rates (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2011).  In modern times, religiosity is associated with 
various traits desirable in a mate, such as fidelity and an increased willingness to have children 
(Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2016; Norenzayan et. al., 2016). 
The ability to remember counterintuitive information has already received some attention 
from both psychologists and anthropologists.  Boyer and Ramble (2001) found in a variety of 
populations that counterintuitive information is more recallable than intuitive information.  
Gonce, Upal, Slone, & Tweney, (2006), used a method in which half of the participants received 
a word list containing both intuitive and counterintuitive items.  The other participants received 
the same word list where each word also had a “context”, a short intuitive or counterintuitive 
description about the word.  Both intuitive and minimally counterintuitive words were recalled 
significantly better than maximally counterintuitive words (words which had many 
counterintuitive traits).    
Of particular importance to the present experiment is Porubanova et. al. (2014).  These 
researchers presented participants with forty-eight items consisting of a noun and an adjective.  
Nouns were grouped into four categories (human, animal, plant, and object), while adjectives 
were divided into intuitive, counterintuitive (called “ontologically counterintuitive”) and 
culturally counterintuitive (information which violate cultural expectations but maintain physical 
expectations).  After a two-minute distractor task, participants were asked to recall as many items 
as possible, both adjective and noun.  Subjects were also contacted after a month and given a 
recognition task, including the forty-eight original concepts and forty-eight new concepts.  The 
study found that, in immediate recall, intuitive items were significantly better-recalled than 
ontologically counterintuitive items; however, in the delayed recognition task, the opposite 
occurred.  In both tests, culturally counterintuitive items were recalled significantly more often 
than either intuitive or ontologically counterintuitive items. 
However, several of these experiments have had confounding factors.  For example, 
animacy presents a confound in Porubanova et. al., 2014.  The experiment divides items between 
having “agents” and “non-agents”, but the majority of plants and objects are given 
counterintuitive and culturally-counterintuitive traits, effectively describing them as having 
animacy (e.g.: a hungry kettle).  Given that animacy produces an effect on memory (VanArsdall, 
Nairne, Pandeirada, & Blunt, 2013), these descriptions could have caused inanimate nouns to be 
processed not only as counterintuitive, but as animate, leaving animacy as a confound.  
Furthermore, several foundational experiments, such as Boyer & Ramble, 2001, also took place 
in uncontrolled testing environments, such as a market square. Our study aims to examine 
memory for counterintuitive traits using larger sample sizes and a better-controlled testing 
environment. We adopted a similar method to the one used by Porubanova et. al. (2014) but 
corrected the errors in their method.  
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The current experiment also extended existing research on memory for counterintuitive 
information by using a nonword learning paradigm.  Participants viewed four-letter nonwords 
paired with items composed of a noun and an adjective.  Items were fully counterbalanced so 
that each nonword would be paired equally with an animate and inanimate item, as well as an 
intuitive and a counterintuitive item, in separate word lists given to separate groups of 
participants.  Participants were asked to rate on a 1-5 scale how likely each item was to be from 
Earth, as opposed to a different dimension where things were different.  After a short distraction 
task, participants were asked to recall as many nonwords as they could, then to match nonwords 




This experiment included one hundred and four viable participants recruited from Purdue 
University.  Only native English-speaking participants were included in the analysis because the 
stimuli will include many English words (nouns and adjectives), and participants unfamiliar with 
these words may have experienced difficulty determining if a description is intuitive or 
counterintuitive.  Participants were tested in groups of four per session.  Each session lasted no 
more than twenty-five minutes and took place on individual computers used in the Purdue 
Psychology building.  
Materials 
The experiment, operated on the program Qualtrics, included a word list of twenty nouns, 
forty adjectives, and twenty pronounceable nonwords.  The nouns include five inanimate objects, 
five plants, five animals, and five types of people (such as “butcher” and “runner”).  Each noun 
was paired with an intuitive adjective and a counterintuitive adjective.  All adjectives described 
physical properties of the noun.  Half of the adjectives described intuitive properties, while the 
other half described counterintuitive traits, traits which could not be present in reality 
(transparency, floating, etc.).  The stimuli are included in the appendix in Table 1 and Table 2.   
Each noun was also paired with a pronounceable nonword, a false word designed to appear as 
though it could be from the English language.  All nonwords were drawn from ARC nonword 
database (Rastle, Harrington & Colheart, 2002), and all were four letters in length. 
From the twenty nonwords and descriptions, the experimenters formed four lists, 
described as 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B.  All twenty nonwords were present across the word lists, and 
each contained 10 animate items and 10 inanimates, as well as 10 intuitive and 10 
counterintuitive descriptions. However, descriptions, word order, and the pairing between 
nonword and description varied in a controlled fashion between the lists.  Lists of the same 
number contained the same descriptions but varied in the pairing of nonwords and descriptions; a 
nonword paired with an animate item in 1A was paired with an inanimate item in 1B.  This was 
meant to better examine animacy effects by controlling for the item (nonword) itself.  Similarly, 
lists of the same letter contained the same pairings between nouns and nonwords but varied in 
intuitiveness: a nonword with an intuitive description in 1A had a counterintuitive description in 
2A.  This was meant to examine the effects of intuitiveness on recall. Finally, all four word lists 
also had four randomized orders; during the experiment, participants would be randomly 
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assigned to see two of the four randomized orders. The net result was that a given nonword 
appeared in each of the relevant experimental conditions across participants.  
Procedure 
On arrival, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four versions and seated at 
one of the four computers in the testing space.  There they read and signed a consent form and 
were instructed to begin the experiment on the computer in front of them.  After beginning the 
program, they received instructions for the experiment.  Participant were given two practice test 
trials in which they saw a rating task identically formatted to that of the main task; however, the 
nonword names and their descriptions were merely dummy items and were not target items or 
included in any analyses.  Once this was done, the participants were re-presented with the 
instructions and progressed to the target items.   
Each nonword-description pair was presented on screen for 10 seconds.  During this time, 
participants completed a rating task. In this task, participants studied the item  and made a rating 
by clicking on the appropriate box on-screen.  Ratings were on a 1-5 scale judging how likely 
items were to be from Earth, as opposed to a different dimension where some things differed.  5 
corresponded to “very likely to be from Earth”, while 1 corresponded to “very unlikely to be 
from Earth.” After 10 seconds, the program automatically progressed to the next pair.  After each 
participant rated each of the pairs once, they performed the rating task again, with the items 
arranged in a different randomized order.  After the rating tasks, participants performed a two-
minute even/odd distractor task.  Single-digit numbers appeared on screen for two seconds 
apiece, and participants were asked to designate them as “even” or “odd” by clicking on the 
appropriate box on-screen.  After the participants completed the distractor task, they were given 
the free recall test.  Participants had 5 minutes to type all the nonwords from the word list that 
they could recall.  The free recall task was followed by the matching recall task; participants had 
five minutes to drag and drop nonwords from one side of the screen to their appropriate 
descriptions on the other. 
Results and Discussion  
Rating 
 Items were rated on what percentage of answers given aligned with the intuitiveness 
category that the item was in.  For example, if an item was deemed counterintuitive and 80% of 
replies, stated that it was unlikely or very unlikely to come from Earth, that object would receive 
a score of 80%.  Most items received high scores above 80% (mean 83%, median 89%).  
Interestingly, most lower scores were given to items which were counterintuitive and inanimate 
(mean of all conditions 83%, mean of counterintuitive inanimate items 66%).  An image of these 
averages can be seen in Figure 1.  
 Analysis found that intuitive items received significantly higher scores than 
counterintuitive items on both the subject (F(1,103)=18.804, p<0.01) and item level 
(F(1,103)=18.552, p<0.01).  Similarly, animate items received significantly higher scores than 
inanimate items on both the subject (F(1,103)=84.99, p<0.01) and item (F(1,103)=18.552, 
p<0.01) levels.  However, these differences may be because counterintuitive and inanimate 
objects received the majority of lower scores.   
Free Recall  
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 Data in the free recall test indicated that there were significant effects of animacy and 
intuitiveness.  Data were scored with both strict and lenient methods; in strict, only a perfectly-
spelled correct reply was accepted, whereas in lenient, nonwords with one letter misspelled were 
also accepted. Consistent with prior research, participants recalled animate items significantly 
better than they did inanimate items in both strict (F(1,103)=14.63; p <0.001) and lenient 
(F(1,103)=18.318; p<0.000) conditions.  Participants also recalled intuitive items significantly 
better than counterintuitive items in both the strict (F(1,103)=18.55; p <0.001) and lenient 
(F(1,103)=5.769; p<0.019) conditions.  No significant interactions were found in the strict 
(F(1,103)=2.29; p>0.133) or lenient (F(1,103)=0.079, p<0.780) methods. Category averages for 
strict and lenient free recall can be found in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively.  
Matching 
 Results in the matching section were inconsistent with those found in both the rating and 
free recall sections.  When analyzed on the subject level, no significant effects of animacy 
(F(1,103)=0.012, p>0.9) or intuitiveness (F(1,103)=4.039, p>0.137) were found.  When analyzed 
on the item level, no significant differences were found in levels of animacy (F(1,103)=0.868, 
p>0.4) or in levels of intuitiveness (F(1,103)=7.811, p >0.068).  Category averages can be found 
in Figure 4.  
Discussion 
 None of the data gathered in this experiment support the Minimal Counterintuitiveness 
Effect.  Test results disagree about whether intuitive information is remembered significantly 
more often than intuitive information.  However, in no case is counterintuitive information 
recalled significantly more often than intuitive information.  Even in tests in which no significant 
difference was found, intuitive information is on average more accurately recalled. This is 
directly contrary to the Minimal Counterintuitiveness Effect.   
Several explanations are possible for this finding.  The first explanation is that the Effect 
is simply incorrect, and that existing empirical support for the theory is due to random chance or 
experimental confounds.  Second, the Minimal Counterintuitiveness Effect proposed for this 
effect could be partially correct but lacking a necessary detail. For example, in experiments 
which study the Minimal Counterintuitiveness Effect by using narratives, counterintuitive 
information is often presented amidst a larger group of intuitive information.  For every 
counterintuitive detail explained, there might be three intuitive details. Perhaps in experiments 
such as ours, in which counterintuitive information is just as common as intuitive information, 
the counterintuitive information is so common that it is expected, and therefore loses part of its 
memorability. If this is the case, the theory about the Effect could be updated by adding that 
counterintuitive information must be in the numerical minority, or something in a similar spirit. 
Either explanation would help to explain why the Effect has received inconsistent empirical 
support. Alternatively, it is possible that our decision to use nonwords is somehow blocking the 
Minimal Counterintuitiveness Effect.  
 Overall, the data gathered do not support the Minimal Counterintuiveness effect.  Tests 
stated that either no significant differences were found between recall and rating of intuitive and 
counterintuitive items, or that intuitive items were significantly better-recalled than 
counterintuitive items.  Even in cases in which no significant differences were found, measures 
of central tendency usually supported intuitive items as being, on average, better-recalled and 
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more accurately rated.  A follow-up experiment, titled Experiment 2, is currently under design 
and is intended to examine a type of concept not addressed by the Minimal Counterintuitiveness 
Effect: “culturally counterintuitive” concepts.  As defined by Porubanova et. al. (2014), 
culturally counterintuitive concepts have a detail that makes them expectation-violating for 
individuals who come from a culture accustomed to a different detail but are not fundamentally 
impossible in the ontological way that minimally counterintuitive items are.  For example, it is 
perfectly possible to have a plate in the shape of a right triangle, but for many people used to 
circular or square plates a plate of this shape may violate expectations in a way that is similar to 
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Table 1.  List of people and animal items. 
“Animate” Noun Counterintuitive Adjective Intuitive Adjective 
artist An invisible An inexperienced 
butcher A flying A bearded 
pilot A transparent An ugly 
runner A resurrected A hideous 
teacher A ghostly A healthy 
horse A barking A galloping 
koala A swearing A motherly 
rabbit An evaporating A hopping 
skunk A copper A stinky 
tiger A writing A roaring 
 
Table 2.  List of plant and inanimate object items. 
“Inanimate” Noun Counterintuitive Adjective Intuitive Adjective 
grape A radiant A purple 
grass A shrinking A growing 
onion A diamond An infected 
orchid A liquid A colorful 
tree A jumping A thick 
clock A molten A plastic 
fence A floating A wooden 
mirror A gelatinous A shattered 
plate An untouchable A square 
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Figure 1. Average proportion correct during rating task by item condition.  
 
 
Figure 2. Average proportion correct during free recall task by item condition.  Strict recall only. 
 
 


























































































Investigating the Minimal Counterintuitiveness Effect 9 
 






























Counterintuitive-Animate Counterintuitive-Inanimate Intuitive-Animate Intuitive-Inanimate
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 C
o
rr
ec
t
Item Category
Subject-level
Item-level
